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Fair trade: global problems and individual responsibilities
Sarah C. Goff*
Department of Government, London School of Economics & Political Science, London,
United Kingdom
The topic of global trade has become central to debates on global justice
and on duties to the global poor, two important concerns of contemporary
political theory. However, the leading approaches fail to directly address
the participants in trade and provide them with normative guidance for
making choices in non-ideal circumstances. This paper contributes an
account of individuals’ responsibilities for global problems in general, an
account of individuals’ responsibilities as market actors, and an explana-
tion of how these responsibilities coexist. The argument is developed
through an extended case study of a consumer’s choice between conven-
tional and fair trade coffee. My argument is that the coffee consumer’s
choice requires consideration of two distinct responsibilities. First, she has
responsibilities to help meet foreigners’ claims for assistance. Second, she
has moral responsibilities to ensure that trades, such as between herself
and a coffee farmer, are fair rather than exploitative.
Keywords: fair trade; exploitation; responsibility; global justice; ethical
consumerism
The topic of global trade has become central to debates on global justice and
on duties to the global poor, two important concerns of contemporary political
theory. The leading approaches evaluate trade in terms of its impact upon the
global poor (Pogge, 2002; Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005), or they view the trade
regime as an important site of global justice (James, 2012; Risse, 2012,
pp. 261–280). For a consumer choosing between a conventional coffee brand
and a fair trade brand that costs a bit more, the moral signiﬁcance of her
choice is often understood in terms of its impact on global poverty or the real-
ization of global justice. Peter Singer would advise the consumer to choose fair
trade coffee as a way to transfer resources to the global poor (2006). Andrew
Walton argues that choosing fair trade coffee has expressive effects that can
motivate others to act on their duties of global justice (2012).
The empirical literature also evaluates fair trade as a mechanism for
transitioning to a better world, whether this consists in a world without poverty
or a just global order. Among scholars who evaluate fair trade as a means of
alleviating poverty (Arnould, Plastina, & Ball, 2009; Ruben, Fort, &
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Zúñiga-Arias, 2009), the current consensus is that fair trade’s effects tend to be
positive for participating farmers. However, these studies acknowledge that fair
trade’s impact tends to be modest and that its beneﬁts do not reach the poorest
of the world’s poor. Other scholars evaluate fair trade as a political movement:
The act of selling goods can be used as an opportunity to educate consumers
about the need to change an unjust international trading system, and as a vehicle
for demonstrating a practical alternative for trade that better serves the needs of
people in the global South. (Low & Davenport, 2006, pp. 315–316)
These scholars tend to view fair trade as a political movement in crisis, due to
the fact that many retailers are de-emphasizing political messages in favor of
‘mainstream’ marketing practices.
In this paper, I will argue for a different understanding of the role of fair
trade in non-ideal theory. While others have argued that individuals are
required to purchase fair trade products as a mechanism for transitioning to a
better world, this paper will argue that fair trade purchases are required in
order to respect a provisional duty of non-exploitation of their trading partners.
I will argue that consumers have duties of fairness that are speciﬁc to their
roles as participants in global trade, given that their trading partners have
unmet claims under present non-ideal conditions. Taking the coffee consumer
as an illustrative example of a participant in trade, my argument that she
should purchase fair trade coffee will rely on evidence that the fair trade coffee
industry tends to provide farmers with higher prices than conventional coffee.1
The argument is restricted to trades that are mutually beneﬁcial, and not harm-
ful overall for their participants. A trade that is beneﬁcial overall for a partici-
pant can contain some harmful components, such as health risks from poor
working conditions. Participants in trade are individual or collective entities
whose economic choices involve them in direct or indirect exchanges with
other participants.
Many persons, including coffee farmers, have claims for others to secure
their entitlements or to offer help in accordance with duties of humanity. In
my view, all individuals have claims to enjoy membership in what I call ‘mini-
mally just’ societies. When a society fails to meet standards of minimal justice,
its members have claims to international action to address its deﬁciencies. Such
actions might include ﬁnancial transfers, service provision, or political pres-
sure. When persons have unmet claims to enjoy membership in minimally just
societies, this can increase their willingness to accept relatively unfavorable
terms of trade. I take a Guatemalan coffee farmer as an illustrative example of
an individual with an unmet claim for membership in a minimally just society.
My market-based standard for fair trade references the terms of trade that
both parties would have freely accepted, in an idealized counterfactual market
in which no party’s claims to live in a minimally just society are unmet. If this
counterfactual trade is more favorable to the party with an unmet claim, then
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their actual trade is exploitative. I will argue that a participant in trade, such as
the coffee consumer, can be responsible for exploitative trade in two different
senses. First, she can be responsible for helping to enable or facilitate the back-
ground conditions under which exploitation can occur. Second, she can be
responsible for her own engagement in exploitative trade. While responsibility
for facilitating exploitative trade can be discharged through various mecha-
nisms, the latter responsibility can only be fulﬁlled through choices made as a
participant in trade. The consumer ought to offer the coffee farmer fair terms
of trade, which are the terms the farmer would have freely accepted under
background conditions in which he enjoyed the beneﬁts of membership in a
minimally just society.
The paper provides a new way to understand exploitation in trade and its
relationship to individuals’ responsibilities to non-compatriots, bridging a gap
between consumer ethics and global justice.2 The argument proceeds as fol-
lows. The paper will describe a Guatemalan coffee farmer as an illustrative
example of an individual with an ‘unmet claim’ for international action to pro-
mote institutional reforms to his society. Then the paper will describe trade
between this individual and a far-away consumer, explain the impact of his
unmet claim on their terms of trade, and argue that their trade is exploitative.
Subsequently, the paper will describe a coffee consumer’s responsibilities in
general and to a coffee farmer in particular. Finally, it will respond to four
objections.
Part 1: International action to promote minimally just societies
The premise of my argument is that the background conditions of global trade
are characterized by a fundamental asymmetry. Some people live in minimally
just societies, while other people have claims for international action to help
make their societies minimally just or, failing that, to provide an approximation
of the beneﬁts of membership in such societies. The idea that there is a duty to
provide international action to reform the basic structure of societies owes a
debt of inspiration to John Rawls’ argument for a ‘duty of assistance’ in the
Law of Peoples (1999, pp. 105–120). I will suggest that my characterization of
the background conditions of trade is not especially controversial when stated
at an appropriate level of generality. There is an assumption that individuals
have a responsibility to assist others, and I will argue that the duty to promote
institutional reforms to societies can be derived from this general view.
Minimal justice and claims for international action
When an individual does not live in a minimally just society, he or she has a
claim for international action that is best understood as a human rights claim. I
follow interpreters who have taken a practical approach to specifying the idea
of human rights, which encompass multiple conceptions of how to justify and
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specify the content of human rights (Beitz, 2009; Shue, 1980). The core idea
is that individuals’ claims for respect of their human rights are addressed ﬁrst
to their own societies, and that these societies should provide institutional pro-
tections to secure their members’ rights against standard threats. Individuals
have secondary claims for international action when societies fail to meet a
threshold of respect for their members’ human rights.
To meet human rights claims, international actors often try to inﬂuence and
pressure societies to adopt reforms. In addition, international action to promote
minimally just societies can consist of ﬁnancial and technical assistance. While
the international actors that try to promote human rights will typically be
states, NGOs, or international bodies, these collective entities rely upon indi-
vidual contributors. In this sense, claims for international action to promote
minimally just societies ultimately correspond, albeit imperfectly, to individual
duty-bearers.
A society’s capacities
To be minimally just, a society must have certain capacities, such that its insti-
tutions are capable of performing a set of important basic functions. These
state-level functions include, among others, securing the rule of law, maintain-
ing roads and a transportation network, and other public infrastructure and
basic public goods (Messner et al., 2015). My standard of capacity also
includes important basic functions of civil society, such as the maintenance of
peaceful relations among diverse groups and the mutual social trust required
for economic market relations.
Some of these functions are essential for the satisfaction of an individual’s
claim for justice, or an individual’s claim for respect of her human rights. It is
hard to imagine how an individual can enjoy justice or respect for her human
rights when her society fails to secure the rule of law. The capacity to deliver
basic services is instrumental for satisfying individuals’ claims for greater well-
being, for justice, or respect for human rights. Aid organizations often declare
their intention to ‘build capacity’ within aid-recipient societies (OECD, 2005),
and I suggest that these are ethically important contributions.
A society’s inclusiveness
When a society is structured so that all members share in the beneﬁts of the
society’s use of its capacities and have some voice in its decision-making, then
the society meets my standard of inclusiveness. Consider a hypothetical society
that has generally capable institutions, which includes an infrastructure capable
of providing services for the populace’s health. Unfortunately, this society’s
health system fails to provide due consideration for the interests and concerns
of people with serious mental health problems. The society has the capacity to
provide for its members’ well-being, but it is not structured to perform its
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capacities in a sufﬁciently inclusive way. While many real-life societies are
deﬁcient both in capacity and inclusiveness, this hypothetical society illustrates
that individuals can have speciﬁc claims for greater inclusion within an exist-
ing institutional scheme.3
Individuals’ claims for greater inclusion are primarily directed to their fel-
low citizens, but they also can be directed to international actors. An interna-
tional advocacy group might pressure a target society to improve its treatment
of a marginalized group, in order to meet this group’s claims for international
action. Alternatively, an international assistance program might provide this
group with services that approximate those it would receive within a minimally
just society.
When an individual’s society has insufﬁcient capacity or inclusiveness, she
has a claim to international action. I suggest we could ground this claim using
multiple theories of global ethics, albeit most clearly using a Rawlsian theory of
global justice. Thomas Pogge, a leading cosmopolitan, has argued that the global
order is not only problematic because it causes global poverty, but also because
it undermines the prospects for democracy and good governance in developing
countries (2003). Peter Singer has stated, in response to criticism that his view
overlooks the importance of institutions, that his argument would endorse
any effective strategy for alleviating global poverty (2005, pp. 179–181).
Methodologically speaking, the standard of a ‘minimally just’ society has the
beneﬁt of being ecumenical across these theories of global ethics.
Part 2: Exploitation in the coffee trade
This section describes trade between a coffee consumer and a Guatemalan cof-
fee farmer. The farmer provides an illustrative example of an individual with
an unmet claim for membership in a more capable and inclusive version of his
society. I will ﬁrst explain how the consumer and farmer are engaged in a trade
relationship of an indirect sort, then trace the impact of the farmer’s unmet
claim on his working conditions, and ﬁnally argue that the terms of their trade
are exploitative.
The indirect agreement to trade
This section elaborates an account of the two actors’ interactions within a glo-
bal supply chain. I describe an indirect agreement between the coffee con-
sumer and the coffee farmer, which explains the circumstances under which a
coffee consumer can engage in exploitative trade with the coffee farmer.
A coffee consumer typically buys retail coffee that has been grown,
roasted, transported, packaged, marketed, and locally stocked – a multi-stage
production process involving the farmer, roaster, transporters, packagers, mar-
keters, and the retail store. The consumer’s choice to purchase coffee depends,
whether she knows it or not, on a series of prior trades. The farmer would not
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grow coffee beans if he did not expect that he could sell them to a roaster,
who in turn expects to sell them to retailers, and so on until a store manager
expects to sell them to the consumer. All of these actors make their choices
conditionally on their predictions of the choices of the other actors. Moreover,
each actor’s pursuit of his self-interest has a predictable limiting impact on the
other actors’ pursuit of their interests.
An individual consumer can be understood as a participant in trade with a
coffee farmer under two conditions: the consumer’s price sensitivity has bear-
ing on the quality of a coffee farmer’s working conditions, and the consumer
enjoys a lower price for her coffee when the coffee farmer’s working
conditions are worse. The difference between farmers’ take-home pay from
conventional and fair trade coffee production indicates that the consumer’s
price-sensitivity indeed does have an impact on farmers’ working conditions.4
In addition, it is well known that consumers pay higher retail prices for fair
trade coffee than conventional coffee. Since both conditions hold, the coffee
consumer and the coffee farmer are in an indirect agreement to trade.
There are some intermediaries whose decisions and sensitivity to price
changes may have an independent impact on farmers’ working conditions.
Consider a coffee farmer who values having a reliable and long-term contract
with a roasting company, the buyers of his coffee beans. The coffee consumer,
however, typically purchases coffee at the lowest retail price and this price
ﬂuctuates with global markets. In view of the consumer’s expected behavior,
the roaster offers farmers a contract to sell coffee beans at a given price (repre-
senting the farmer’s Working Conditions). By predictably purchasing coffee at
the lowest retail price, the consumer has made an indirect agreement with the
farmer that provides him with unfavorable Working Conditions. Now consider
if the roaster wished to provide farmers with more favorable Working Condi-
tions*. If the roaster must pass the additional costs of providing Working Con-
ditions* onto the consumer, then the roaster is merely an intermediary that
facilitates the consumer’s trade with the farmer. However, if the roaster can
absorb some of the costs from its proﬁt margins and chooses not to do so
when this is expensive, then the roaster meets the two conditions for being a
participant in trade with the farmer. The roaster’s price sensitivity has bearing
on the quality of a coffee farmer’s working conditions, and the roaster enjoys
a lower price (higher proﬁt margins) when the coffee farmer’s working condi-
tions are worse. While this paper’s argument mainly addresses consumers, it
also describes the duties of intermediaries to trade fairly when they are not
merely facilitators for others’ agreements, but also participants in trade in their
own right.5
The coffee farmer’s claim and its impact
Many Guatemalans have unmet claims for international action that would
promote minimal justice in their society. Guatemala is a society deﬁcient in
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inclusiveness, and the effects are evident in its high levels of inequality and
the severe poverty of its rural and indigenous populations. Economic inequality
and high rates of poverty at least partially attributable to the way Guatemala is
organized as a society; see, for instance, Guatemala’s low minimum wage rate,
which recently has been criticized as inadequate for meeting the costs of living
(United Nations Human Rights Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner, 2015). Some
would argue that the low minimum wage level merely reﬂects the low level of
economic development in Guatemala, and thus it fails to show that the soci-
ety’s structure is deﬁcient in inclusiveness. Guatemala’s deﬁcits in capacity, as
seen in its failures to enforce its own labor legislation, provide a more
convincing test of the impact of its domestic institutions on workers.
In response to Guatemala’s failure to enforce its own labor laws, the US
recently has taken the unprecedented step of bringing a labor rights complaint
against Guatemala under the CAFTA-DR. Moreover, according to a recent
report, this failure to enforce the law impacts Guatemalan coffee farmers: ‘One
of the biggest factors that impedes the government’s ability to protect coffee
sector workers from exploitation is its deﬁcient labor inspections system. Prob-
lems facing the Labor Inspectorate include a lack of staff and funding, the fact
that inspectors sometimes have to pay for their own gas (which disincentivizes
them from visiting remote locations), the inability of inspectors to set ﬁnes,
and labor inspectors’ fear of carrying out inspections in the agricultural sector
due to the high level of violence in Guatemala (Verité, 2012, p. 12). This evi-
dence suggests that, were Guatemala to have greater capacity to enforce the
rule of law and protect its own labor inspectors against threats of retaliatory
violence, coffee farmers would enjoy better treatment from their employers.
These improved working conditions could include payment of the legally man-
dated minimum wage, a working day limited to eight hours and/or overtime
pay, receipt of paystubs, and other elements currently found to be lacking for
Guatemalan coffee workers (Verité, 2012, p. 18).
Dani Rodrik has argued that democracies’ legislation and public policies
tend to favorably ‘affect the bargaining strength of labor and the value of outside
options available to workers and employers’ (1999, p. 731). In support of this
argument, Rodrik shows a positive correlation between higher scores on demo-
cratic governance indicators and higher wages. Rodrik uses Freedom House’s
1–7 ratings of civil liberties and political liberties and Polity III’s ratings of the
competitiveness and openness of the political process (as well as the restraints
on the executive branch) as his democratic governance indicators. These indica-
tors provide ratings on a continuous scale of the openness of the political pro-
cess, as well as the society’s protection of civil liberties, for both democracies
and non-democracies. I submit that these indicators provide a partial rating of a
society’s ‘capacity’ and its ‘inclusiveness.’ Rodrik’s ﬁndings thus provide sup-
port to the following hypothesis: if Guatemala were minimally just, we could
expect more favorable legislation and public policies to structure the domestic
labor market so as to better favor the bargaining position of workers.6
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To model this relationship, I designate Working Conditions to describe the
terms of the farmer’s work. These terms include the price he receives for his
beans and his employer’s adherence to labor standards, which will be treated
together as a single composite measure of the quality of his terms of work.
Working Conditions* are the terms the farmer would have chosen in his coun-
terfactual bargaining position. I have argued that Working Conditions* are
likely to be better than Working Conditions, due to the farmer’s more favorable
bargaining position in the counterfactual. While I cannot specify Working Con-
ditions* in detail here, a useful point of reference is the working conditions for
coffee farmers who live in societies that already approximate a ‘minimally just
society,’ such as Costa Rica. I will describe Costa Rica’s legislation to regulate
the coffee industry in the ﬁnal section of the paper. So far, I have argued that
the Guatemalan coffee farmer’s unmet claim to enjoy membership in a
minimally just society is likely to have an unfavorable impact on his working
conditions.
Why the trading relationship has unfair terms
Trade occurs when two participants agree to exchange goods and services on
terms that each participant views as beneﬁcial for himself. Trade has ethical
value when it reﬂects and manifests these individuals’ free choices to promote
their mutual interests. When there are wrongful constraints upon one partici-
pant’s free choice and no wrongful constraints upon the other’s, this can
impact the terms of trade. My ‘market-based standard of fairness’ references
counterfactual terms of trade that both parties would have agreed to accept
under different background conditions. Exploitation occurs when the actual
terms of trade are less favorable to one party than in the counterfactual where
that party already enjoyed the satisfaction of her claims.
To illustrate the signiﬁcance of an unmet claim as a constraint on a person’s
free choice, consider an example of a trade in a domestic context. Alan offers to
hire Sally for a low salary and Sally, viewing it as her best job offer, chooses to
accept. Perhaps Sally can only satisfy her occupational preference by accepting
a job with Alan and, due to this constraint, she accepts Alan’s low salary. I sub-
mit that Sally’s occupational preference is ethically neutral or, at the very least,
not the sort of thing that other people have duties to change. When Sally accepts
Alan’s offer, their trade simply reﬂects their free choices, bounded by constraints
that are themselves ethically unproblematic. An argument that Sally’s low salary
is ‘unfair’ will only succeed, I suggest, if Sally has an unmet claim for someone
to remove the constraints upon her free choice.
For an instance of such a constraint, consider if all employers in the labor
market informally excluded Sally from opportunities to perform ‘men’s work.’
I submit that Sally has a claim for her fellow citizens to remove this constraint,
because pervasive discrimination in the labor market undermines the inclusive-
ness of their society. When Sally has an unmet claim and Alan does not, it is
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appropriate to ask if trade on Alan’s proposed terms would be unfairly
exploitative. We might reason that, in a counterfactual in which she had not
experienced exclusion from opportunities to perform ‘men’s work,’ Alan would
have agreed to hire Sally for a higher salary. To show that Alan would have
agreed to a higher salary, we need to reference the prices in a counterfactual
labor market that does not arbitrarily exclude women from opportunities. In
constructing this counterfactual, it is important to change only individuals’
unmet claims and consider all the plausibly unrelated conditions of the actual
market as ﬁxed points, including Alan’s company and Sally’s occupational
preferences. Starting from the fact that Sally has an unmet claim (alongside
other women), we can construct a counterfactual market in which employers
do not arbitrarily exclude women from opportunities.7
It is illuminating to compare my market-based standard to two distinct
kinds of exploitation theories from which my argument has drawn inspiration.
The ﬁrst is Alan Wertheimer’s view that equilibrium prices in a perfectly com-
petitive market are non-exploitative, because at this price neither party takes
‘unfair advantage’ of the other (1996, p. 232). I agree with Wertheimer that
exploitation only occurs when a participant actually receives unfavorable terms
of trade, not whenever background conditions make her vulnerable to such
treatment (Wertheimer, 1996, pp. 298–299). I endorse Wertheimer’s view that
fair terms of trade are the prices participants would accept within a hypotheti-
cal market, but I do not view a perfectly competitive market as the correct
hypothetical. When there is a perfectly competitive market for a good or ser-
vice, the terms of trade are exactly the same for all participants, and on
Wertheimer’s view this means that no party takes ‘special’ unfair advantage of
any other party (Wertheimer, 1996, pp. 230–236). In my view, a more appeal-
ing ideal is a counterfactual market that is closely modeled on both parties’
actual bargaining conditions, except for the fact that neither party has an unmet
claim for membership in a minimally just society. The prices within this coun-
terfactual market are fair because the participants freely accept their terms of
trade, not because the prices are the same for all parties.8
For a second group of theorists, exploitation can only occur if a distinctive
moral wrong is present in the background conditions of trade. On Ruth
Sample’s theory of exploitation, a person must be vulnerable, due to her
unmet basic needs or her experience of injustice, in order for trade to degrade
her (2003, pp. 74–75). Steiner (1984) argues that exploitation can only occur
when a person has suffered a rights-violation. Exploitation occurs when this
rights-violation has knock-on effects upon a subsequent trade, although neither
the rights-violator nor the person who suffers the rights-violation must be par-
ticipants in this trade (Steiner, 1984, pp. 232–233). I agree with the general
position, taken by both Sample and Steiner in their respective arguments, that
exploitation can only occur when someone has been non-compliant with moral
requirements. My own view is that non-compliance poses constraints on partic-
ipants’ freedom to trade, which makes it possible for their trades to be unfair.
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In my view, the enabling conditions for exploitation to occur are present
when a participant in trade has an unmet claim to enjoy membership in a mini-
mally just society, and it actually occurs when the participant’s unmet claim
has an unfavorable impact on her terms of trade. By contrast, Sample’s theory
includes cases in which a person’s vulnerability does not produce worse terms
of trade. For instance, a person with neglected basic needs could require more
favorable terms of trade than he would otherwise, so that he is not exploited
(Sample, 2003, pp. 73–75). Thus, Sample collapses two responsibilities that in
my view are best kept separate: the general responsibility to meet foreigners’
claims and the speciﬁc responsibility to trade fairly. For Steiner, the exploited
party is not necessarily the same person whose rights have been violated, but
simply a person whose trade has been inﬂuenced by the violation. By contrast,
my market-based standard requires us to begin with a person with an unmet
claim and then evaluate, through construction of a counterfactual market,
whether this same person actually suffers from exploitation in his trades.
To follow this procedure with our coffee farmer, we begin with the fact
that the coffee farmer has an unmet claim. Under different background condi-
tions, the coffee farmer would enjoy the beneﬁts of membership in a minimally
just society. Under those conditions, he would have the freedom to trade his
coffee at the market prices in this counterfactual, Working Conditions*. In his
actual circumstances, however, the coffee farmer remains wrongfully con-
strained in his choices. Due to this wrongful constraint, the coffee farmer
accepts the market price for coffee that prevails in his actual circumstances.
This market price, which we have called Working Conditions, represents less
favorable terms of trade for the coffee farmer. These terms are more favorable
to the coffee consumer, and she accepts them freely. In sum, the counterfactual
market price, Working Conditions*, is fair to the coffee farmer. The actual mar-
ket price, Working Conditions, is unfair because it reﬂects and manifests
wrongful constraints upon his freedom.
Part 3: The coffee consumer’s duties and responsibilities
This section explains the normative signiﬁcance of the preceding argument,
speciﬁcally how it addresses the coffee consumer. I will describe a coffee con-
sumer’s duty to foreigners in general, her responsibilities to her trading part-
ners in particular, and how these relate to one another.
An individual’s duty to foreigners and others’ non-fulﬁllment of their duties
I have argued that, on several different theories of global ethics, foreigners
have claims to international action to improve the capacities and inclusiveness
of their societies. If an individual has a responsibility to assist foreigners in
general, a foreigner’s claim to enjoy membership in a minimally just society
should fall within the scope of his concern. Here I will argue that many
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individuals in relatively wealthy, liberal societies are not adequately fulﬁlling
their duties to meet foreigners’ claims in general. As a result of this wide-
spread dereliction of duty, there are many unmet claims for international
action, including but not limited to action promoting institutional reforms to
societies. In this section, I describe the fact of dereliction and suggest that this
fact is relevant for specifying what any particular individual is required to do
in order to fulﬁll her duties to help far-away foreigners.
For the moment, set aside my argument that foreigners have a claim to
international action that aims at institutional reforms to their societies. Consider
instead the less controversial view that foreigners have claims to receive emer-
gency relief from natural disasters, as well as claims for assistance after experi-
encing displacement caused by violence and persecution. In 2015, the UN
consolidated appeals process estimated 89 million people in need of assistance
from natural disasters, 65 million displaced persons, and an overall funding
shortfall of 45% (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2016, pp. 6–7). It is appar-
ent that many individuals are not fulﬁlling their duties, either through private
philanthropy or the contributions of their governments. What are the duties of
any individual to the millions in need of emergency assistance?
Consider the example of Paul Farmer, an individual who has made excep-
tionally large contributions to foreigners’ well-being. Dr. Farmer is a physician
and scholar who has worked to improve access to health serivces for very poor
people through his research and fundraising, direct provision of health services,
efforts to build clinics in poor areas, and public advocacy (Farmer, 2003).
Even after doing all this, however, presumably it is still feasible for Dr. Farmer
to donate additional money for emergency relief. I think it is a very common
intuitive judgment that Dr. Farmer lacks a duty to donate to this speciﬁc cause.
It would be supererogatory for him to perform this speciﬁc action, in addition
to what he already does to improve health services for very poor people. The
example indicates the very general point that there is the need for a limit on
each individual’s duty to foreigners. I believe that Dr. Farmer is not obligated
to donate to emergency relief given how many capable duty-bearers have not
contributed anything. Dr. Farmer has already contributed far more than others,
and many more people have not made their contributions to meeting foreign-
ers’ claims for international action.
Many other persons are derelict duty-bearers, and I suggest that this fact
has two distinct implications for Dr. Farmer and how he should fulﬁll his own
duties to assist foreigners. On the one hand, it is difﬁcult for Dr. Farmer to cal-
culate the precise amount he should contribute. Since he lacks detailed knowl-
edge of other people’s contributions and capacities, he can make merely a
vague estimate of how much he is personally required to do. For a person who
might wish to do his duty and make no further contributions, this vagueness
could be a burden. On the other hand, the dereliction of other duty-bearers has
a more positive implication: Dr. Farmer has greater latitude to choose how he
makes his contribution to meeting foreigners’ claims. If Dr. Farmer prefers to
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meet some claims rather than others, then, as long as he still capably fulﬁlls
his own duty, I suggest that he has some latitude to follow his preferences.
I have argued that each individual’s duty to take action is limited, and the
limit for each person should be speciﬁed by reference to the potential contribu-
tions of other duty-bearers. My arguments fall into the broad category of ‘fair
share’ views, which state that individuals are not required to fully ‘pick up the
slack’ when others are derelict of their own duties (Miller, 2011; Murphy,
2003). Fair share views have been criticized for making insufﬁcient demands
on compliant duty-bearers when claimants are in great need (Singer, 2009,
pp. 144–146). I cannot defend the ‘fair share’ view here; however, this is also
not necessary for the paper’s purposes, as there are alternative ways to specify
the limits of each individual’s duties that are also compatible with this section’s
most important point. The point is that Dr. Farmer is not required to make his
contributions in any speciﬁc way (as long as his way is reasonably effective),
or to direct his contributions to any particular foreigners (as long as he chooses
foreigners with unmet claims).
In sum, an individual has latitude to choose how she makes her contribu-
tion to international action on behalf of foreigners in general. If she has not
made this contribution, however, she shares responsibility with other derelict
duty-bearers for the persistence of many foreigners’ unmet claims.
Responsibility for facilitating the occurrence of exploitation
I have argued many foreigners have unmet claims to enjoy the beneﬁts of
membership in minimally just societies, and that this makes it possible for
trade to be exploitative. When an individual is derelict of his duty to make a
fair share contribution to help meet foreigners’ claims in general, this individ-
ual is subject to moral criticism for two reasons. First, he has failed to meet
foreigners’ valid claims for action, a failure in his responsibility to assist
others. Second, he is morally responsible for the persistence of conditions
under which it is possible that foreigners will be exploited in trade. It is not
necessarily wrong to create (or fail to reform) conditions in which it is possible
for a wrongful act to occur, since it may be easy for others to avoid wrongdo-
ing. However, when conditions are such that others face substantial difﬁculties
in avoiding exploitative trade, an individual who has responsibility for these
conditions has some responsibility for exploitation as well.
To illustrate this point, consider an individual who does not drink coffee or
purchase it for anyone else, and who has not contributed anything to help meet
foreigners’ claims. We can call this person the ‘tea drinker.’ The tea drinker
shares moral responsibility for the fact that many foreigners, including the
Guatemalan coffee farmer, have unmet claims for international action. Along
with many other derelict duty-bearers, the tea drinker shares moral responsibil-
ity for the conditions that enable exploitation in trade. Therefore, even though
the tea drinker purchases no coffee himself, the tea drinker shares some
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responsibility for the exploitative character of the Guatemalan coffee trade.
The tea drinker and other derelict duty-bearers share responsibility with people,
i.e. coffee drinkers, who personally engage in exploitative trade in coffee.
The tea drinker, of course, is not the decisive cause of the fact that the cof-
fee farmer’s claim remains unmet. An ordinary individual’s powers are far too
limited to bring about major institutional reforms in Guatemala, or in any other
country. If the tea drinker had acted on his duty to foreigners, moreover, he
might have directed his efforts to meeting other claims that fall within the
scope of his responsibilities to assist others. As his ‘fair share’ contribution,
the tea drinker might have donated to an NGO that reduces malnutrition
among subsistence farmers in Bangladesh. This donation would not meet any
foreigners’ claim to enjoy the beneﬁts of membership in a minimally just
society, nor would it have any bearing upon exploitative trade in Guatemala,
Bangladesh, or elsewhere. Thus it is not due to any causal impact on the
Guatemalan coffee trade that the tea drinker’s action has moral signiﬁcance.
The tea drinker’s donation is signiﬁcant insofar as it fulﬁlls his ‘fair share’
contribution to meeting foreigners’ claims in general, thereby eliminating his
own responsibility for exploitative trade.
Responsibility for participating in exploitative trade
In this section, I describe a person’s responsibility for participating in exploita-
tive trade, and how this is distinct from the responsibility for enabling its
occurrence. To do so, I consider an individual who is personally engaged in
exploitative trade, but who is not responsible for enabling the general
occurrence of exploitation in trade.
Consider again the example of Dr. Farmer. Since he has made his ‘fair
share’ contribution, he is not responsible for the fact that some foreigners have
unmet claims to enjoy membership in minimally just societies and therefore he
is not responsible for the persistence of conditions under which exploitation
may occur. Now let’s imagine Dr. Farmer makes a coffee purchase. The coffee
farmers who grow the beans do not enjoy membership in minimally just soci-
eties and, as a result, Dr. Farmer receives more favorable terms of trade. Thus,
Dr. Farmer personally engages in an exploitative trade. He bears some moral
responsibility for his personal engagement, insofar as he freely chooses to trade
on terms that manifest deﬁciencies in the freedom of the other participants.
However, responsibility for this exploitative trade is shared between Dr. Farmer
and those who enable the occurance of exploitative trade.
There may be excusing conditions for Dr. Farmer’s participation in
exploitative trade, in virtue of the fact that his choices to trade on exploitative
terms are highly constrained. Constraints upon his knowledge and upon his
ability to act otherwise, due to limited fair trade retail options, are not them-
selves the objects of his responsibility. Indeed, the non-compliance of other
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individuals with their own responsibilities can explain conditions of epistemic
opacity and limited options to trade fairly.
I offer these rough guidelines for individuals’ action, taking into account
that widespread non-compliance can limit their knowledge and scope of feasi-
ble options. First, when individuals know that they have options to make pur-
chases that are non-exploitative trades, they should take these options rather
than engaging in exploitative trades. Second, when individuals have reason to
believe that one option is signiﬁcantly more likely to have unfair terms, they
should choose one of their other options. These two guidelines follow from a
common principle that individuals should avoid exploitation and its likelihood
to the best of their knowledge. Third, when the only options are likely to have
substantially unfair terms, and the foregone beneﬁts of trade for foreigners are
large, individuals should consider their capacity to offer compensatory target-
ing of assistance to the persons who would suffer from the loss of exploitative
trade (a possibility I describe more fully in the next section).
Part 4: Defending the argument and its assumptions
Here I describe four challenges to the paper’s argument, and I offer responses
defending its theory of exploitation, its empirical basis, and its guidelines for
individuals faced with conﬂict between their two responsibilities.
Challenge 1: The premise of a responsibility to assist
This paper’s theory of exploitation is distinctive in its reliance on the premise
that individuals have a responsibility to assist others, including assistance to
help others enjoy membership in minimally just societies. In comparison to
other theories of exploitation, the premise of this paper’s argument may seem
excessively controversial. Vulnerability theories of exploitation provide a point
of sharp contrast. On these theories of exploitation, a coffee farmer can be
exploited in global trade, due to the farmer’s condition of vulnerability. The
premise that the farmer is vulnerable seems much easier to accept, since it is a
descriptive evaluation of the farmer’s condition, rather than an ethical view that
the farmer has claims on others to help improve his condition. The advantage
of the vulnerability theorist’s approach is that it can address an audience who
deny that there is a responsibility to assist others, and make the case to them
that it is wrong to exploit a person in a state of vulnerability.
In my view, the evaluation that a person is vulnerable is not so easily sepa-
rated from an ethical stance about the claims he can make on others, and this
is especially true for cases of global trade. Cases of global trade, when raised
as potential instances of exploitation, most frequently include individuals suf-
fering from poverty or a lack of human rights protections. While it seems
uncontroversial that an individual is vulnerable when he is poor or lacks secure
enjoyment of his human rights, the intuitive wrongness of exploiting an
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individual who experiences these conditions is at least partially attributable to
the fact that, for many people, these conditions also activate ethical concern.
Unless the vulnerability theorist clearly denies that a person suffering from
poverty or a lack of human rights protections is owed ethical concern, the
common intuition will persist and may play an implicit role in the vulnerability
theorist’s argument.9 By contrast, this paper makes explicit use of the common
intuition with its premise that there is a primary responsibility to assist others
who do not live in minimally just societies. The explicit acknowledgment of
this premise avoids confusion. While this paper’s argument cannot hope to
convince an audience who denies there is a responsibility to assist others, the
premise allows the argument to do the work of distinguishing between the pri-
mary wrong suffered by persons with unmet claims, and the secondary wrong
of exploitation experienced by a subset of the ﬁrst group.
Challenge 2: The impact of minimal justice on wages
On this paper’s argument, a Guatemalan coffee farmer is exploited in trade
because he would enjoy better wages and working conditions if his society
were minimally just. Guatemala is a society that is deﬁcient in capacity and
inclusiveness, and its coffee farmers suffer from ineffective enforcement of
labor laws and low minimum wages. Here, I provide further evidentiary sup-
port for the paper’s counterfactual claim that the farmer would be better off in
a minimally just society. I present Costa Rica as a case of a society that
approximates minimal justice, and explain how its domestic legislation helps to
increase Costa Rican farmers’ share of global market price of coffee. By
demonstrating that coffee farmers are better off in a society that approximates
minimal justice, I provide support for the proposition that Guatemalan coffee
farmers would be better off in a minimally just version of their own society.
Compared with other countries in Central America, Costa Rica is notable
for its high rates of public spending and high degree of economic equality.
Costa Rica has unusually high minimum wage levels, and these have been
shown to have a positive effect on the actual wages received by its workers
(Gindling & Terrell, 2005). Costa Rica engages in extensive regulation of the
coffee industry, particularly to ensure that domestic processing mills do not
take an excessively high share of coffee revenues at the farmers’ expense. Law
2762 in Costa Rica empowers the Instituto del Café de Costa Rica (ICAFE), a
research institute, to determine the price domestic mills can charge for their
services. ICAFE ensures Costa Rican farmers receive the global market price
for coffee beans, minus a ﬁxed cost for domestic processing, and this system
has been shown to be effective in limiting the mills’ earnings to ‘strictly
normal economic proﬁt’ (Ronchi, 2006, pp. 21, 22).
Costa Rica provides a clear case of a society’s use of domestic legislation
to improve conditions for coffee farmers. In my view, Costa Rica’s regulation
of the coffee industry reﬂects the values of an inclusive society. The aim of
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regulation is not merely to meet the farmers’ basic needs, which might have
been accomplished through a guarantee of a minimal price for their labor.
Instead, Costa Rican farmers are provided with the balance of the global mar-
ket price for coffee, after ICAFE subtracts a ﬁxed processing cost for the mills.
This safeguards farmers’ relative share of the value of domestic coffee produc-
tion, and in my view this reﬂects Costa Rica’s inclusion of farmers and their
interests in its distributional scheme. Moreover, this domestic regulation to
improve inclusiveness is compatible with participation in globally competitive
markets: farmers enjoy higher prices for their beans, while Costa Rica follows
the price for coffee as set in the global market.
The case also highlights the range of groups and non-state actors that can
help a society achieve good levels of capacity and inclusiveness, and therefore
provide fair terms of trade for its workers. ICAFE, a domestic research insti-
tute, provides crucial information and technical support to extend the state’s
regulatory capacity over the coffee industry. In other societies, labor unions
may pressure the state to maintain its inclusiveness and its regulatory capaci-
ties. In Guatemala, however, the labor union movement is very weak, due in
part to the high murder rate for the leaders of labor unions (Verité, 2012,
p. 39). The state must be willing and able to cooperate with non-state actors,
as in the case of ICAFE in Costa Rica, or to provide minimal forms of sup-
port, such as protection against retaliatory violence for labor unionists in the
case of Guatemala. While a variety of non-state groups can provide assistance
given adequate cooperation and support, capable and inclusive public
institutions are the fundamental requirements of a minimally just society.
Challenge 3: The extent of conﬂict between the two responsibilities
I will argue here that several common concerns about fair trade are based upon
questionable empirical assumptions. Thus, cases of conﬂict between individu-
als’ responsibilities to assist and their responsibilities to avoid exploitation arise
less frequently and are less difﬁcult to manage than is often believed.
One concern is that encouraging consumers to purchase fair trade could
cause trade diversion from poor countries. A primary aim of fair trade is to
provide workers with a ‘premium’ above market rates, not to relocate produc-
tion to societies with higher labor costs. However, it may be hypothesized that
fair trade purchases will tend to shift production to middle-income countries,
where it may be easier to meet standards for fair trade certiﬁcation. Economists
generally argue that trade with poor countries is essential for poverty reduction
in the long run. Agricultural exports from poor countries are particularly
important for alleviating poverty, because agricultural production employs low
skilled workers in rural areas (Winters, McCullouch, & McKay, 2004, p. 100).
If fair trade shifts coffee production to middle-income countries, this may
reduce trade’s contribution to poverty alleviation, particularly by reducing its
potential to increase employment among low-skilled agricultural workers.
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However, one study found no statistically signiﬁcant differences between
coffee producing countries that exported to TransFair USA in 2005–2007 and
those that did not, either in the countries’ real GDP per capita or in the income
share of the poorest 20% of the populations (Stoddart, 2011, p. 133). This
indicates the fair trade industry is neither more nor less likely than the
conventional coffee industry to purchase beans from poor countries. While
middle-income countries are not presently over-represented in the fair trade
industry, it could be further objected that consumers may preferentially select
products from middle-income countries as a strategy to avoid exploitative
trade. I suspect that preferentially selecting products from middle-income
countries is unlikely to be an effective strategy for avoiding exploitative trade,
although I am unable to evaluate its effectiveness here.10 Instead, I will ques-
tion the view that trade diversion to middle-income countries reduces the cof-
fee trade’s potential to alleviate poverty. One reason to question this view is
the relatively new fact that a majority of the global poor are now living in
middle-income countries (Sumner, 2012). Furthermore, Smith (2009, p. 30)
notes that critics of fair trade have highlighted the industry’s presence in Mex-
ico, a relatively developed country, but overlooked severe poverty among cof-
fee farmers in Mexico’s region of Chiapas. Since there is no scarcity of poor
farmers in middle-income countries, and poor coffee farmers generally stand to
beneﬁt from increased employment, it is not clear that shifting coffee produc-
tion from poor to middle-income countries would have a signiﬁcant effect on
coffee farmers’ poverty.
Another common concern is that fair trade industries undermine efforts to
alleviate global poverty, because they misalign incentives for poor countries’
economic development (Kurjanska & Risse, 2008, pp. 45–49). Kurjanska and
Risse argue that fair trade industries improve the attractiveness of economic
activity at the bottom of the global value chain, speciﬁcally agricultural pro-
duction, and thereby discourage more productive investments. However, the
objection fails to take account of the non-ideal conditions of poor economies,
speciﬁcally low-skilled workers’ high rates of unemployment. Given high
unemployment, fair trade industries are unlikely to absorb workers who would
otherwise seek out opportunities in a ‘new, more proﬁtable, less volatile sector’
(Kurjanska & Risse, 2008, p. 46). Thus, the argument that fair trade coffee dis-
torts incentives is undermined by its idealizing assumption that coffee produc-
ing societies already have full employment economies (Hayes, 2008, p. 2959).
As poor societies develop their economies and transition to more ideal circum-
stances, fair trade industries might become inappropriate at the same time that
they become unnecessary.
A ﬁnal concern has to do with moral psychology, namely, whether individ-
uals who purchase fair trade will do less to fulﬁll their responsibilities to aid
others. However, survey evidence indicates that consumers who purchase fair
trade goods view them as complementary to their participation in other ethical
activities, such as donations to charity (Langen, 2011). In addition,
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Kathryn Wheeler’s studies of fair trade supporters and consumerism in the UK,
USA, and Sweden illustrates that there are multiple coexisting modes of
engagement with fair trade organizations. Fair trade provides opportunities for
some people to become engaged supporters of fair trade organizations’ political
activism, thereby enabling them to fulﬁll their ﬁrst-order responsibilities to
contribute toward transitioning to a better world. For fair trade consumers who
are not politically active in fair trade organizations, their purchases do not
seem to induce a false sense of satisfaction that they have already made ade-
quate contributions to their ﬁrst-order responsibilities:
When asked about fair-trade, the majority of non-fair-trade supporters could rec-
ognize the moral value of trying to help producers receive a fair price for their
crop; they were, however, often quite critical of the suggestion that consuming
fair-trade was the only way to be a responsible citizen and skeptical that chang-
ing their individual consumer habits would have much impact upon poverty in
the developing world. (2012, pp. 9–10)
Challenge 4: The problem of limited options
This paper has argued that consumers should choose fair trade coffee over con-
ventional brands, because consumers are more likely to avoid personal engage-
ment in exploitative trade when they purchase fair trade coffee. However, since
the empirical evidence is not conclusive, the options currently provided by the
fair trade industry are not assured to represent fair terms of trade. In view of
this limitation, consumers might adopt a policy of avoiding trade with mem-
bers of societies that are not minimally just. If members of relatively wealthy,
liberal societies adopt a policy of avoiding trade with unjust societies, many
mutually beneﬁcial trades will be foregone, including many trades that would
not have been exploitative. The attitude adopted toward moral risk, a topic that
cannot be addressed in this paper, is important for evaluating the policy of
complete avoidance of potentially exploitative trades. Setting aside the attitude
toward moral risk, it may be objected that the paper’s argument provides a rea-
son in favor of adopting the policy of avoidance, because the policy would
eliminate exploitative trades.
The value of avoiding exploitation must be weighed against the substantial
losses of trade for members of unjust societies. The loss of trade for members
of unjust societies is ethically signiﬁcant insofar as it sets back efforts to allevi-
ate their poverty. The paper’s argument can take account of the ethical impor-
tance of poverty alleviation, because a duty to alleviate poverty can be derived
from the responsibility to assist foreigners in general. The avoidance policy puts
the responsibility to avoid exploitation into conﬂict with the responsibility to
assist, so it is worth noting how the paper’s argument views the two responsibil-
ities as distinctive. On this paper’s theory of exploitation, it is unfair to trade on
unfavorable terms that the other participant agrees to accept because she has an
unmet claim to enjoy membership in a minimally just society. This theory of
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exploitation depends on the premise that there is a responsibility to assist, which
explains why foreigners’ claims are a matter of ethical concern. However, the
wrongness of exploitation does not derive solely from the failure to assist for-
eigners with their claims, but also from a deﬁciency in the respect participants
in trade owe one another for their freedom to trade. A participant in an exploita-
tive trade fails to respect the other participant, whose unmet claim diminishes
the freedom she ought to have when agreeing to the terms of their trade. Since
the responsibility to trade fairly is not reducible to the responsibility to meet for-
eigners’ claims, the paper’s argument recognizes the value in fair trades that are
mutually respectful of the participants’ freedom to trade and the distinct value
in trades that promote the aim of poverty alleviation.
To evaluate the relative weights of these values at stake in the avoidance
policy, it is important to take note of its implications for different groups.
Employment is a good that is particularly valuable for workers who are poor,
because it directly addresses their condition of economic need. All else being
equal, the poorest workers are the group that will beneﬁt the most from
employment. If an individual makes his trading decisions a site of action for
poverty alleviation, his optimal strategy is to seek out trades with the poorest
workers to direct employment opportunities to them. If this same individual
has the additional aim of avoiding any risk of personal engagement in exploita-
tion, his modiﬁed strategy is to seek out trade with the poorest workers who
live in minimally just societies and to avoid trade with workers in unjust soci-
eties. As a result of this modiﬁcation, the poorest workers who live in mini-
mally just societies will have more employment and the poorest workers who
live in unjust societies will have less.
Reasoning through this modiﬁcation in strategy has shown that a justiﬁca-
tion is potentially owed to the group of the poorest workers who live in unjust
societies, in case this paper’s argument for fair trade has a tendency to reduce
employment for this group and thereby increase its poverty. An increase in this
group’s poverty constitutes a setback to efforts to meet their claims for assis-
tance, and thus it would be appropriate to give priority to this group when act-
ing on the responsibility to assist. Monetary aid and direct service provision
are some of the many possible ways to act on the responsibility to assist for-
eigners, and in these priority can be given to the poorest workers in unjust
societies above the poorest in minimally just societies. In case it is true that
efforts to trade on fair terms will have the tendency to divert trade to mini-
mally just societies, this paper’s argument supports the following guidelines:
choose fair trades over exploitative trades and, when acting on the responsibil-
ity to assist, give priority to the poorest workers in unjust societies.
Conclusion
My argument has offered normative guidance to individuals as they make
choices about how to act upon their duties to foreigners in general, and how to
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act upon their responsibilities to the particular foreigners with whom they
trade. The argument is meant to address a broad set of readers, who may hold
divergent views about the extent of individuals’ duties to foreigners in general.
Some readers will view individuals’ duties to foreigners as relatively weak.
When these readers consider ‘international action’ to help foreigners, they
might envision small ﬁnancial transfers or liberalizing reforms to the migration
and trade regimes. Their reading of my argument will indicate that most trades
have fair terms, and that individuals have limited responsibilities for enabling
the conditions of exploitative trade. Other readers will believe that there are
severe problems with the institutions of the global order and that individuals
have strong duties to promote reform. Their reading of my argument will indi-
cate that many trades are unfair, and that individuals have signiﬁcant responsi-
bilities for enabling the conditions of exploitative trade. This paper has not
intended to resolve disagreements about the severity of global problems and
the allocation of ﬁrst-order responsibilities for addressing them. Instead, the
aim has been to provide a general framework for understanding how partici-
pants in trade should trade fairly while global problems persist.
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Notes
1. Jeremy Weber calculates an average premium of 12.8 cents per pound for fair trade
organic growers in southern Mexico (2011).
2. Fairness in trade as an element of corporate social responsibility also falls within
the scope of the argument but, unfortunately, I cannot discuss corporations fully
here. See this paper’s discussion of domestic businesses in Costa Rica as
(surmountable) obstacles to farmers’ enjoyment of fair terms of trade.
3. A society is inclusive when it is structured for the beneﬁt of all its members, even
if some members have unsatisﬁed needs. Health provision is a useful example for
showing this difference: even while enjoying the beneﬁts of a fully capable and
inclusive health system, inevitably some people will remain unhealthy.
4. See note 1.
5. When the consumer and the roaster are both participants in trade with the farmer,
each trading relationship has its own separate impact on the farmers’ working
conditions. While I cannot do so in this paper, one could compare the relative
signiﬁcance of (1) the consumer’s indirect agreement with the farmer and (2) the
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roaster’s direct trading relationship with the farmer, for determining the farmer’s
working conditions.
6. Amartya Sen’s well-known ﬁnding that there have been no famines in democracies
also supports a relationship between the inclusiveness of the political process and a
society’s protections for its poor (1999, pp. 182–188).
7. See Goff (2016) on the ideal of a labor market in which employers do not discrimi-
nate against female job seekers. Employers discriminate in the sense that they make
similar errors in judgment about women’s qualiﬁcations, and these errors can be
expected to constrain women’s opportunities.
8. To identify fair terms of trade for imperfectly competitive markets, it is necessary
to model the inﬂuence of one party’s unmet claim on prices. This is a less reliable
modeling exercise than in cases of perfectly competitive markets, but it is neverthe-
less possible to produce a range of possible values.
9. Vulnerability theorists are unlikely to wish to deny this. Ruth Sample (2003) views
vulnerability as a condition for global exploitation. She deﬁnes vulnerability
descriptively, in terms of basic needs, and in terms of a person’s experience of
injustice. Robert Goodin (1987) has a descriptive account of a person’s vulnerability
to exploitation; however, he also argues for a duty to protect the vulnerable.
10. In future work I intend to assess whether there is a correlation between a society’s
economic development and whether it is minimally just.
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